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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
NATURE OF THE CASE, COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS. AND DISPOSITION IN
LOWER COURT:
This case involves an order by the Securities Advisory Board
of the Utah Division of Securities (the "Division") that affects
trading in the stock of approximately forty-seven (47) corporations
formed by the Petitioner, Capital General Corporation

("CGC").

That Order was challenged by CGC in a District Court proceeding.
Judge Russon dismissed the District Court case and awarded Rule 11
sanctions (in the amount of $1395) against CGC on the grounds that
CGC's claims were barred by the doctrine of collateral estoppel.
The District Court found that the parties and the issues were
identical

in this

case

and

in the

case of

Capital

General

Corporation v. Utah Department of Business Regulationsr Securities
Division, 777 P.2d 494 (Utah App. 1989) (hereinafter referred to as
the "Amenity" case because of the name of the corporation whose
stock was at issue in that case), which was fully and finally
litigated.

The case was then appealed to the Utah Court of

Appeals, which upheld both the Division's actions and the District
Court's dismissal and sanctions award.

See, In re H & B Carriers.

et al.. Capital General Corporation v. Department of Business
Regulations, Utah Securities Division, 180 Utah Adv. Rep. 23 (Utah
App. Feb. 10, 1992).

A Petition for Rehearing was Filed by CGC on

February 24, 1992, and was denied on March 9, 1992. CGC then filed
its Petition for Writ of Certiorari on April 8, 1992.
Statement of the Facts:

During 1986, Capital General Corporation created at least
forty-seven (47) "shell" corporations1, including Amenity, Inc.
(which is the subject of the Amenity case), H & B Carriers, Inc.
(originally known as "Y Travel," which is the lead corporation on
the full caption of the present case), and some forty-five (45)
others (which are all named in, and affected by, the present case).
None of the forty-seven corporations registered their stock with
the Division.

CGC then gave small portions of the stock in each

corporation to a large number of recipients, with CGC retaining the
overwhelming majority of the stock in each shell corporation. The
effect of these gifts was to make each shell corporation into a de
facto

publicly held corporation, bypassing

various

state and

federal securities laws pertaining to registration of initial
public offerings, and making the shell corporations much more
valuable.2
The Division found that CGC's gifts were not "good faith
gifts" within the meaning of the Utah Securities Act, which
excludes good faith gifts from the definition of offers and sales
of securities, because the intent in making the gifts was to
l

A "shell" corporation is one that has substantially no assets
and conducts substantially no business.
2

Publicly held shell corporations can be sold for significant
amounts of money because they can be merged with operating
businesses that are not publicly held corporations in such a way
that the resulting entity is a publicly held corporation that bears
the name of the operating business. This technique, known as a
reverse merger, allows an operating business to become a public
corporation without going through the federal and state
registration requirements for an initial public stock offering.
For example, Amenity, Inc., which was originally capitalized by CGC
for $2,000, was sold in a reverse merger for $25,000.
- 2 -

circumvent the disclosure requirements of the Utah Securities Act.3
The Division also found that CGC's gifts were "for value" because
the value of shell corporation stock held by CGC greatly increased
as a result of giving away a small portion of the stock in each
corporation.

Based upon those findings, and pursuant to Utah Code

Annotated section 61-1-14(3), the Division ordered that none of the
corporations could claim any transactional exemptions from the Utah
Securities Act's registration requirements/

In other words,

before anybody could trade any stock belonging to any one of the
forty-seven corporations, that corporation would have to register
its stock with the Division.5
3

CGC argues that there is evidence of subjective good faith
because CGC's president testified at the administrative hearing
that, on an unknown date, he talked to an unknown person at the
Utah Division of Securities and made a general inquiry as to
whether people who give gifts of stock need to register the gifts.
He did not disclose any details about CGC's plan, its scope or
nature, or the fact that the goal of the gifts was to create de
facto public corporation. The Utah Court of Appeals found that
"[b]ecause this evidence is so general, vague and uncorroborated,
it has little weight or relevance." 180 Ut. Adv. Rep. at 24.
4

Action was first brought with respect to Amenity, Inc., and
then thereafter with respect to the remaining shell corporations in
a separate case. The Amenity case remained at least one stage
ahead of the other case (which is the case currently before the
court).
5

Contrary to CGC's assertion in its Petition, the Division's
actions do not permanently prevent any stock from becoming fully
alienable.
All that is necessary is for the corporation in
questxon to register its stock with the Division.
Since CGC
controls the overwhelming majority of the stock in the corporations
at issue, it could easily elect boards of directors who would
register each corporation. Naturally, the Division may condition
registration on adequate disclosure and compliance with Utah blind
pool laws, and may deny registration on the basis of fraud, etc.
To date, however, none of the forty-seven corporations has
attempted to register, although a successful registration would
allow shareholders to sell their stock.
- 3 -

ARGUMENT
The Utah Supreme Court has already denied a nearly identical
petition for writ of certiorari. with respect to points I and
II (of the current petition), in the Amenity case:
The Utah Court of Appeals handed down the Amenity decision on
July 3, 1989. On August lf 1989, CGC filed a petition for writ of
certiorari.

Certiorari was denied on September 12, 1989.6

The

petition raised the following point:
Point One:
A Writ of Certiorari should be granted
because the Court of Appeals decided a question of law in
conflict with a prior decision of this court and
construed the plain words of the controlling statute
contrary to their usual and customary meaning.
This point is essentially identical to the first two points
raised in the current petition:
Point I: A Writ of Certiorari should be granted because
the Court of Appeals has ignored the clear meaning of a
statute and thus sanctioned an invalid use of a statute.
Point II: A Writ of Certiorari should be granted to
determine whether the decision of the Court of Appeals is
in conflict with a prior decision of this Court, namely
Andrews v. Chase, 89 Utah 51, 49 P.2d 938 (1935).
It would be anomalous if the Supreme Court were to grant
certiorari in this case, after denying a certiorari petition from
the same party, alleging the same errors and based upon the same
facts.

That is particularly true give the nature of the current

Court of Appeals decision, which can be fairly summarized as
follows:

"This case is factually indistinguishable from Amenityf

6

The Supreme Court case number for the Amenity case is 890339-

SC.
- 4 -

and therefore is bound by the Amenity decision as a matter of
precedent." What CGC is challenging in its current petition is not
really the current Court of Appeals decision (except in so far as
it asserts that the present case is identical to Amenity^, but
rather the earlier Amenity decision.7
The doctrine of collateral estoppel, also known as issue
preclusion, bars Capital General Corporation from relitigating
the same issues that were decided against it in the Amenity
case;
The Honorable Leonard H. Russon dismissed this case at the
district court level because the doctrine of collateral estoppel
bars Capital General Corporation from relitigating the issues
decided against it in the Amenity case. The Court of Appeals chose
not to directly address the issue in its opinion/ but this Court
would have to address it if certiorari is granted.
Collateral estoppel, also known as issue preclusion, exists
when there was a prior action where: (1) the issues are identical;
(2) the

judgment

competently

is

litigated;

final;
and

(3) the
(4)

the

issues
party

were

fully

precluded

and
from

7

Indeed, the question of whether the Utah Supreme Court case
of Andrews v. Chase, 89 Utah 51, 49 P.2d 938 (1935) applies was
only analyzed in the Amenity decision. See, 777 P.2d at 497, n.3.
The current Court of Appeals decision makes no reference at all to
the Andrews case.
8

The Court of Appeals assumed, arguendo,
that collateral
estoppel did not exist for purposes of analysis, probably because
that court found it easier to base its decision on the grounds that
Amenity is binding precedent. See, 180 Utah Adv. Rep. at 24. The
issue remains, however, as a valid alternative theory on which to
uphold the results reached by the Court of Appeals. Indeed, the
Court of Appeals must have presumed the existence of collateral
estoppel, because it upheld the District Court's award of Rule 11
sanctions, which was based upon collateral estoppel.
- 5 -

relitigating the issues was a party to the prior action. Madsen v.
Borthick, 769 P.2d 245, 250 (Utah 1988); Trimble Real Estate v.
Monte Vista Ranch, 758 P.2d 451, 454 (Utah App. 1988).
There is no doubt as to requirements

(2), (3) and (4).

Amenity was fully, competently, and finally litigated, and Capital
General Corporation, the sole appellant in this case, was the sole
appellant in Amenity.9

The only question is whether the issues in

this case are the same as those in Amenity.
The Court of Appeals determined

in Amenity that Capital

General Corporation's scheme of "giving away" stock in order to
create publicly held companies constitutes a sale of a security,
777 P.2d at 496-97; that Capital General Corporation failed to meet
its burden of showing that its transfers were "good faith gifts,"
777 P.2d at 498; that the Securities Advisory Board has statutory
authority to deny or suspend secondary trading in the unregistered
stock held by Capital General Corporation, 777 P.2d at 498-99; and
that the case of Andrews v. Chase is not applicable. Those are the
same substantive and legal issues raised in this case.
Capital General Corporation has admitted that "the Amenity
facts and the facts of the present case are identical in all
respects,

the

basic

difference

being

that

Mr.

Yeaman

was

unavailable to testify in the Amenity matter [on the issue of good
9

Much of CGC's petition is filled with expressions of concern
for "innocent" shareholders, such as those who received "gifts" of
stock in the various corporations. Interestingly, none of those
shareholders, and none of the corporations that are directly
affected by the Division's order, have ever chosen to get involved
in this litigation. The only party on the petitioner's side is the
petitioner itself.
- 6 -

faith] . . . ." See, Capital General Corporation's Memorandum in
Support of Petition for Review, at 4.
Mr. Yeaman's testimony is irrelevant because it goes to the
issue of good faith, an issue that was fully and finally litigated
in Amenity.10

The doctrine of collateral estoppel does not allow

an issue to be relitigated simply because counsel wish to present
different testimony in the second trial.

The testimony presented

by Mr. Yeaman is as relevant to the good faith issue in Amenity as
it is to this case, and it was Capital General Corporation's burden
to put that evidence on in the first case.11

Capital General

Corporation must raise new issues, not merely the specter of new
testimony concerning already decided issues, in order to avoid
collateral estoppel; with the exception of Point III, relating to
the District Court's imposition of Rule 11 sanctions, Capital
General Corporation has failed to raise a single issue that was not
raised and resolved in the Amenity proceeding.

Should certiorari

10

This case is so closely tied factually to the Amenity case
that Amenity, Inc. is discussed at length in the Securities
Advisory Board's Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and
Recommended Order.
Likewise, the Court of Appeals actually
referred, in the Amenity decision, to the corporations whose stock
is at issue in this case: "Additional evidence of CGC's economic
self-interest and its lack of gratuitous intentions is shown by the
fact that CGC similarly
converted
at least
thirty
other
private
companies using the same method employed here."
Ill P.2d at 498
(emphasis added).
u

The fact that Mr. Yeaman was "unavailable" to testify in the
Amenity case is irrelevant. Mr. Yeaman is the President of Capital
General Corporation, and it was Capital General Corporation's
responsibility to either ensure his availability, obtain a
continuance, or introduce similar evidence from other witnesses.
A failure to present all of your evidence in the first proceeding
is no defense to a claim of collateral estoppel in a subsequent
proceeding.
- 7 -

be granted, all aspects of this case, except for the Rule 11
sanctions issue, will have to be decided against Capital General
Corporation on the basis of collateral estoppel. Since collateral
estoppel would prevent the Court from reaching the merits of the
Amenity decision, there is no benefit to granting a writ of
certiorari.
Points I and II of the current petition do not raise the sort
of "special and important reasons" required for a grant of
certiorari under Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 46;
Setting aside the problem of reaching the merits of CGC's
arguments due to the collateral estoppel issue, CGC has failed to
raise concerns sufficient to warrant a writ of certiorari. Rule 46
of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure state that a writ of
certiorari
reasons."

"will

be

granted

only

for

special

and

important

The rule then goes on to give examples of such reasons.

Point I of CGC's petition asserts that the Court of Appeals'
reading of the Utah Securities Act is flawed in several respects,
but it fails to assert that "the Court of Appeals has rendered a
decision that has so far departed from the accepted and usual
course of judicial proceedings

. . . as to call for an exercise of

the Supreme Court's power of supervision."
added).

Rule 46 (emphasis

In essence, Point I is simply a dispute over the meaning

of statutory provisions, which it says "clearly" mean one thing,
but which the Court of Appeals (and the Division) say clearly mean
something else.
Amenity

Actually, the Court of Appeals' decision in

is decidedly pedestrian.

All that

it says is that

sometimes transactions that appear to be gifts of securities really
- 8 -

should be deemed to be sales when the giver receives something of
value as a result of giving the giftf and that the Division may
deny a corporation access to any exemptions from stock registration
requirements when it used such non-gifts as a means to evade the
registration requirements of Utah law.

Unless the Utah Supreme

Court is intent on micro-managing the decisions of the Court of
Appeals, it should leave such an unremarkable decision undisturbed.
Point II of the petition admittedly involves an allegation
that the Court of Appeals decided Amenity in a way that is in
conflict with a Utah Supreme Court opinion, namely Andrews.

Even

a cursory look at the Andrews case and subsequent legislation shows
that Andrews both

lacks precedential

value and

is factually

distinguishable.
Andrews is a 1935 case that involved gifts of assessable
stock, which the Utah Supreme Court held were gifts, and not sales.
Since 1935 the legislature has enacted two relevant changes to the
securities laws.

One change was to explicitly call a purported

gift of assessable stock an "offer or sale."

See, Utah Code Ann.

§ 61-1-13(15)(c)(ii) (1989). The other change was to state that a
"good faith gift" does not constitute an offer or sale.
Code Ann. § 61-1-13(15)(d)(i) (1989).

See, Utah

Both changes occur in a

portion of the Utah Securities Act that attempts to give examples
of what is an offer or sale, and what is not.

In essence, the

legislature has said that some gifts are made in good faith,
without reciprocal value to the giver, while other "gifts" are not
made in good faith and are sales, a category that explicitly
- 9 -

includes gifts of assessable stock.
Even if Andrews retained any precedential value, the case is
factually distinguishable.

As the Court of Appeals noted in

Amenity;
In Andrews, the gift of stock was made with the mere
expectation of future, speculative benefits in the form
of assessments the donees would voluntarily choose to
pay. See Andrews, 49 P.2d at 942. Here, the disposition
of the Amenity, Inc. shares created an immediate, actual
benefit to CGC in that it now owned substantial shares in
a public company which, but for the disposition, would be
a private company.
Amenity, 777 P.2d at 497-498 n.3. In its petition, CGC argues that
this is a specious distinction because creating a public company
only creates a potential for benefit that depends "upon the further
efforts of the givers (infusion of assets, work to make the company
viable, etc.)."

Petition, at 17. The facts of Amenity show that

CGC's assertions are simply wrong. Amenity, Inc. was worth $2,000
when

it

was

first

incorporated

as

a

privately

corporation by the name of "Y Travel, Inc."
became a de

facto

held

shell

Once Y Travel, Inc.

publicly held shell corporation it became a

viable merger partner for a privately held business, without the
infusion of any additional assets or work.

In fact, such a merger

took place to form Amenity, Inc., and CGC received $25,000 for its
stock in Y Travel, Inc.
Point III of the current petition, pertainina to
Rule 11 sanctions by the District Court, is based
error by the trial court, and not by the Court of
is therefore not a valid independent basis for
petition:

the award of
upon alleged
Appeals, and
a certiorari

The Court recently made the following remark in a footnote:
- 10 -

We take this opportunity to remind the bar that when
exercising our certiorari jurisdiction granted by section
78-2-2(3)(a), we review a decision of the court of
appeals, not of the trial court. . . .
To restate the
matter: We do not grant certiorari to review de novo the
trial court's decision.
Butterfield v. Okubo, 184 Utah Adv. Rep. 27, 33 n.2 (Utah April 7,
1992) (citations omitted).
In the present case, the Court of Appeals applied an "abuse of
discretion" standard, and found that the District Court did not
abuse its discretion in awarding Rule 11 sanctions against CGC. In
its petition, CGC has not argued that the Court of Appeals applied
the wrong standard; rather, CGC has only argued that the District
Court abused its discretion.

This is nothing but an attempt to

have this Court review the District Court's decision de

novo,

contrary to the language in Butterfield.

CONCLUSION

The Utah Supreme Court should deny the writ of certiorari
sought by Capital General Corporation.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 8th day of May, 1992.
R. PAUL VAN DAM
Attorney General

DAVID N. SONNENREICH
Assistant Attorney General
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